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No. XLVII/2 (2025)
Articles

Prosecutors as sentencers? Prosecutorial sentencing discretion re-imagined

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  • Alena McClure
Alena McClure
Charles University
Bio

Published 2026-06-03

Keywords

  • public prosecution,
  • sentencing,
  • sentence recommendations,
  • continental prosecution,
  • prosecutorial discretion

Copyright (c) 2026 Alena McClure

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

“Prosecutors as sentencers? Prosecutorial sentencing discretion re-imagined: Prokuratorzy jako sędziowie? Prokuratorska swoboda decyzyjna na nowo wyobrażona” (2026) Archives of Criminology, (XLVII/2), pp. 155–174. doi:10.7420/AK2025.11.
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Abstract

Despite its growing influence, the sentencing discretion of continental European prosecutors has remained largely underexplored. This paper seeks to fill that gap by offering a systematic account of prosecutorial sentencing discretion in continental Europe. It identifies five core dimensions through which prosecutors exercise sentencing discretion, illustrating how prosecutorial decisions shape sentencing outcomes, both directly and indirectly. The study sheds light on the critical – yet often overlooked – role of prosecutorial hierarchy in guiding and constraining these decisions. Drawing on psychological, organizational and doctrinal perspectives, the paper identifies key sentencing mechanisms and explores their practical implications. In doing so, it provides a novel perspective on the role of continental prosecutors in sentencing and offers pathways for future research.

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