Make a Submission
No. 4 (154) (2002)
Artykuły

Skazanie oskarżonego bez rozprawy sądowej a zasady procesowe

[Conviction of the defendant without trial and procedural rules]

  • Radosław Koper

Published 2002-12-30

Keywords

  • procedural rules,
  • conviction without trial,
  • criminal proceedings,
  • rule of law,
  • accused,
  • adversarial principle,
  • presumption of innocence
    • ...More
    Less
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

How to Cite

Skazanie oskarżonego bez rozprawy sądowej a zasady procesowe: [Conviction of the defendant without trial and procedural rules]. (2002). Studia Prawnicze The Legal Studies, 4 (154), 121-142. https://doi.org/10.37232/sp.2002.4.6

Abstract

Therefore, if a court examining the prosecutor's motion for sentencing without trial finds doubts as to whether the defendant committed the alleged act at all, or whether he/she committed it in the form of the offence to which he/she has pleaded guilty, it should refuse to grant this motion, leaving the case to be examined under the general rules (Article 343 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). In such a case, it will be necessary to conduct the evidentiary proceedings at a hearing so as to clarify the existing doubts.

If the institution of sentencing without trial is applied, will the two descriptions of the act [i.e. the act charged and the act attributed] coincide, or will the court, at the hearing under Article 343 of CCP, be able to introduce changes to the description of the imputed act. The ability of the court to amend the description of the act in the judgement must depend on the nature of the amendment. Indeed, if the absence of a specific element in the description of the offence charged is the consequence of an oversight by the prosecutor and, in the light of the evidence on record, the circumstance to which the amendment would relate is undoubted, there is no obstacle to the court being able to make that amendment to the description of the offence contained in the judgement. It would be advisable for this to take place with the agreement of the parties. If, on the other hand, the possibility of altering the description of the act, as noted by the court, is linked to the doubts identified with regard to the circumstances of the commission of the offence, and the clarification of these doubts requires a fresh examination of the evidence, it is obvious that, in view of the necessity to disregard the prosecutor's request at that time, making such alterations is out of the question. If the doubts identified are confirmed at trial, the court will amend the description of the offence attributed to the defendant in the judgement accordingly.

When considering a request for sentencing without trial, the court does not a priori take for granted the facts established by the material presented by the prosecution. The court is entitled and obliged at all times to check whether the conditions for the application of Article 335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are met. The court's review of the fulfilment of the conditions of the institution under consideration is a manifestation of its own findings. The possibility for the court to make its own findings does not alter the fact that, in evidentiary terms, the basis for the judgement to be pronounced at the hearing is the material collected at the pre-trial stage (with the exception of the documents whose evidence was taken at the hearing).

The defendant’s confession is not a necessary condition for the application of Article 335 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This means that the existence of the institution of conviction without trial does not depend on a formal declaration by the defendant containing an admission of his or her guilt. For the application of this institution, it is sufficient that the evidence gathered in the case clearly identifies the defendant as the perpetrator of the offence. While the defendant's consent to a conviction without trial may be accompanied by an admission of guilt or even reparation of the damage caused, it is a manifestation of the offender's voluntary and independent acknowledgement of his or her guilt directly or indirectly.

If the doubts relate to the very fact that a person has committed a crime. In such a situation, Article 335 § 1 of CCP reinforces the operation of the in dubio pro reo rule, because in the event that one of the conditions of the institution under consideration is not met, the case must be heard at a trial. If, as a result of the evidentiary proceedings during trial, the doubts are still not removed, the operation of the in dubio pro reo rule will create the need for a more favourable - compared to a conviction - judgement of an acquittal.

Can a prosecutor request a conviction without trial when, as a result of the in dubio pro reo rule, a milder version of the offence is accepted, which allows the application of Article 335 of CCP, or should the prosecutor then send an indictment to the court requesting a conviction at trial? The operation of the rule in dubio pro reo is not expressly excluded in this case and this rule should not be eliminated by interpretation applied to the detriment of the defendant. The application of this regulation will then be possible after exhaustive use of all available evidence. This is necessary in order to prevent the offender from being convicted under mitigated conditions when there are potential sources of evidence to impute the offence in a more serious form. In such a situation, the limitation of the evidentiary proceedings on the basis of Article 319 of CCP or under Article 335 § 2 of CCP is completely out of the question. If new evidence comes to light in the sentencing proceedings at the hearing, which allows the defendant's act to be classified under a stricter provision, it is understandable that the court will not grant the request for sentencing without trial.

References

  1. Bieńkowska B., Nowy kodeks postępowania karnego przez pryzmat wybranych zasad procesowych [w:] P. Kruszyński (red.), Nowe uregulowania prawne w kodeksie postępowania karnego z 1997 roku, Dom Wydawniczy ABC, Warszawa 1999.
  2. Gostyński Z., Zasada szybkości w nowym kodeksie postępowania karnego [w:] E. Skrętowicz (red.), Nowy kodeks postępowania karnego. Zagadnienia węzłowe, "Zakamycze", Kraków 1998.
  3. Grzegorczyk T., Tylman J., Polskie postępowanie karne, Wydawnictwa Prawnicze PWN, Warszawa 1998.
  4. Hofmański P., Europejska Konwencja Praw Człowieka i jej znaczenie dla prawa karnego materialnego, procesowego i wykonawczego, "Temida 2", Białystok 1993.
  5. Hofmański P., Sadzik E., Zgryzek K., Kodeks postępowania karnego – komentarz. T. 2, Wydaw. C.H. Beck, Warszawa 1999.
  6. Kalinowski S., Polski proces karny, Państwowe Wydaw. Naukowe, Warszawa 1971.
  7. Koper R., Ograniczenie postępowania dowodowego na podstawie art. 335 § 2 k.p.k., „Problemy Prawa Karnego” 2001, nr 24, s. 78-88.
  8. Koper R., Warunki skazania oskarżonego wyrokiem bez rozprawy, „Przegląd Sądowy” 1999, nr 5, s. 72-85.
  9. Koper R., Zgoda oskarżonego jako warunek skazania bez rozprawy, „Palestra” 2001, nr 5-6, s. 7-18.
  10. Kruk E., Uwagi o skazaniu bez rozprawy w nowym kodeksie postępowania karnego, „Prokuratura i Prawo” 1998, nr 4, s. 43-45.
  11. Kruszyński P., Zasada domniemania niewinności w polskim procesie karnym, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 1983.
  12. Marszał K., Proces karny, "Volumen", Katowice 1998.
  13. McDonald W.F., Plea Bargaining. Critical Issues and Common Practices, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Dept. of Justice, National Institute of Justice, Washington 1985.
  14. Mierzejewski P., Postępowanie karne przed sądem pierwszej instancji. Zagadnienia wybrane [w:] P. Kruszyński (red.), Nowe uregulowania prawne w kodeksie postępowania karnego z 1997 roku, Dom Wydawniczy ABC, Warszawa 1999.
  15. Miller H.S., McDonald W.F., Cramer J.A., Plea Bargaining in the United States, Government printing Office, Washington 1978.
  16. Murzynowski A., Istota i zasady procesu karnego, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1994.
  17. Murzynowski A., Ogólna charakterystyka nowego kodeksu postępowania karnego, „PiP” 1997, nr 8, s. 3-24.
  18. Paprzycki L.K., [w:] J. Grajewski, L.K. Paprzycki, Kodeks postępowania karnego z komentarzem, Lex, Sopot 2000.
  19. Prusak F., Komentarz do kodeksu postępowania karnego. T. 2, Wydaw. Prawnicze, Warszawa 1999.
  20. Stachowiak S., Funkcje zasady skargowości w polskim procesie karnym, UAM, Poznań 1975.
  21. Stefański R.A., [w:] Z. Gostyński (red.), Komentarz - Kodeks postępowania karnego. T. 2, Dom Wydawniczy ABC, Warszawa 1998.
  22. Świda Z., Ustalenia faktyczne sądu I i II instancji w świetle nowego k.p.k. [w:] E. Skrętowicz (red.), Nowy kodeks postępowania karnego. Zagadnienia węzłowe, "Zakamycze", Kraków 1998.
  23. Tylman J., Zasada legalizmu w procesie karnym, Wydaw. Prawnicze, Warszawa 1965.
  24. Waltoś S., Dopuszczalność porozumiewania się i uzgadniania rozstrzygnięć przez uczestników postępowania karnego w świetle polskiej procedury karnej [w:] A.J. Szwarc (red.), Porozumiewanie się i uzgadnianie rozstrzygnięć przez uczestników postępowania karnego, Ławica, Warszawa-Poznań 1993.
  25. Waltoś S., Nowe instytucje w kodeksie postępowania karnego z 1997 roku, „PiP” 1997, nr 8, s. 25-40.
  26. Waltoś S., Proces karny. Zarys systemu, Wydawnictwa Prawnicze PWN, Warszawa 1998.
  27. Zachuta A., Kontrowersje wokół nowego kodeksu karnego w świetle praktyki sądowej i prokuratorskiej, „Przegląd Sądowy” 1999, nr 3, s. 112-118.