Nr 3 (65) (1980)
Artykuły

Głosowanie w Międzynarodowym Funduszu Walutowym

[Voting in the International Monetary Fund]

Opublikowane 1980-04-30

Słowa kluczowe

  • głosowanie,
  • Międzynarodowy Fundusz Walutowy

Jak cytować

Głosowanie w Międzynarodowym Funduszu Walutowym: [Voting in the International Monetary Fund]. (1980). Studia Prawnicze The Legal Studies, 3 (65), 185-223. https://doi.org/10.37232/sp.1980.3.6

Abstrakt

The purpose of this study is to confront the model of voting contained in the Articles of Agreement of the IMF with the practice of voting in this organization, constituting a central institution of the international monetary system.

At the beginning, the outlines of the organizational structure of the IMF were presented, as well as the evolution resulting from the practice and from two amendments of 1969 and 1978 introduced into the Articles of Agreement.

After analising the voting formula expressed in article XII IMF and the general voting rules, the Author discusses the voting formula as it appears in the policy of the Fund and its member countries. Next, the practice of voting in the Board of Governors and in the Executive Board is presented. It seems that not¬withstanding a number of provisions of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF concerning voting and voting majorities, the decisions reached in result of voting are rare. The basic method of decision-making is ascertaining the sense of the meeting without the formal votes. This is first of all due to the structure of forces within the IMF and beyond it / the Group of Ten and of developing countries with the OPEC countries among them/, and to the character of the Fund's activity which may be described "operational".

While analizing the structure of forces the Author speaks about the influence of the developing countries on decision-making process. In result of the weighted voting system employed in the IMF, a score of industrial countries have a decisive influence on the activities of the IMF. As for the developing countries, they have about 35 per cent of the total of the voting power. Acceptance of the rule "on state — one vote" in the Fund seems both useless and unrealistic. The countries with the bigest economic potential, on which depends a larger part of the world trade, would not admit the membership of an international organization in which the numeral preponderance was to outweight the economic interests. However, in the future, some changes in the weighted voting formula in the Fund cannot be excluded.